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 In 2006, Jay Rosen penned an astute observation about changing power relationships in 
the media industries in general and more specifically the world of journalism regarding 
the impact of internet. His analysis, titled “The People Formerly Known as the Audience” 
(TPFKATA)1, pointed towards a shift in access to reporting tools (news gathering, 
editing, and publishing) to what used to be imagined by news workers as the audience. 
Rosen and many other industry observers noted how it is not just the tools of reporting 
now being available to TPFKATA (such as blogging, podcasting, vodcasting, and other 
forms of social or “We” media2), but also how emerging forms of legal protection 
(Creative Commons licensing3), and increasing uses of users by professional media 
organizations continue to give the former audience a semi-official status as competitor - 
colleagues. TPFKATA have become special competitors, in the sense that their role is not 
to do a better and cheaper journalism but to do something different and for free. In other 
words: they contribute to design another system that, as Shirky argues4, has made the 
traditional system of information obsolete. Thus, TPFKATA become competitors despite 
their lack of willing to do so, since they do not have any interest to destroy the traditional 
newspapers or their websites. It is the publishers that have made them competitor-
colleagues, by constructing them as playing this role.   
The examples and arguments put forward by Rosen, Shirky and others are not stand-
alone or otherwise marginalized cases. Indeed, it can be said that in most, if not all 
newsrooms today maybe more than yesterday an awareness of the productive behavior of 
TPFKATA is cultivated as an editorial and  managerial strategy. However, many research 
carried out in Europe5 show how faraway are usually the publishers (and the editors) in 
understanding how to manage the relationship with the audience on the economic and 
organizational level. Here, the majority of the press has been characterized by the lack of 
a true interaction with the audience and a situation of dissociate interactivity (that is 
interactivity mainly intra-audience and not between journalists and audiences). While 
journalists showed more sensibility to this issue and became available to do a lot of 
additional and volunteer work in order to respond to audience’s needs, editors were rather 
deaf to the necessity of re-designing an organization of newsrooms based on this new role 
played by TPFKATA. As consequence, departments or sections of the news organization 
charged with organizing (and filtering) the contributions of consumer-citizens tend to be 
under-funded and understaffed.6 
The editorial approach seems in some cases prudent, in other cases obtuse, considering 
how numerous studies all over the world signal how especially younger media users tend 
to produce when they consume their media.7 It seems to make sense, then, as a news 
organization and for journalism as a profession to increasingly shift towards a co-creative 
mode when engaging with contemporary society.  
Flat Hierarchies 
The power relationships between journalists, employers and audiences have been 
transformed in the course of time by a series of concauses. However the shift of the 
power from journalists towards publishers might be characterized by two stages: the first 
has seen jourrnalism domestication by publishers (and editors) who have subjected 
journalists to the macrophysics of power and made them becoming their “legitimators” 
and “guardians.”8 The second stage has seen the publishers destructuring journalism by 
using the internet and the utopia of the networked organization - redesigning the 
profession as simple, immaterial labor. This shift has been made possible by the 
particular features of the profession of journalism which might be described as a 
profession characterized by a double bind9 and which conversely is emblematic of 
Foucault’s analysis on power.10 Generally, double bind theory explains a dilemma in the 
communication process in which an individual (or a group of individuals) receives two or 
more conflicting messages. Journalists represent a case of double bind since they receive 
two conflicting messages: on the one hand, their self-policed professional ethics and 
occupational ideology require that they exercise a right/duty of writing news, facts, 
events, as watchdogs of democracy11; on the other the feature of enterprise of the outlet 
for which they work may conflict with the interest to not publish some specific news, fact 
or event.  In a nutshell, journalists are required to survey and denounce the power which 
gives them the money to live. While the first message is explicit (coming from schools of 
journalism and its much-celebrated history of professionalization), the second is implicit 
and with the former message negating the latter. Thus, the essence of this double bind is 
two conflicting demands, each on a different logical level (the former on the level of 
freedom of information and the other on the level of obedience and loyalty to the 
employer), neither of which can be ignored or escaped. Journalists do not know how to 
respond to the conflict between journalistic ideology, rhetorics and ethics and the 
contrasting requests coming from their employers. If journalists succeed to respond to 
one message, this means failing with the other and vice versa. They can neither discuss 
publicly the conflict, nor resolve it, nor opt out of the situation. In this sense, journalists 
are no different from any other worker in the creative industries, perpetually caught 
between the competing claims of the market (and, in tandem, management), and the 
demands of artistic freedom (or professional autonomy). 
This endless yet essential conflicting situation as the benchmark for journalistic work 
begs different solutions, all located outside the newsroom: going out of the system and 
becoming free lance, opening a blog (or other social media publishing platform), 
becoming an entrepreneur. If a journalist wants to continue to work in a typical 
newsroom, the reporter has to resolve this discomfort by modifying or renouncing his/her 
personal identity and integrity, applying self-censorship and pleasing the employer. This 
self-censure is realized to prevent the censure by the editor and to apply in advance the 
editorial strategy of the outlet. Self-censorship in the journalists’ world is a typical 
mechanism of the adaptation to the microphysics of power. Actually journalism can be 
seen as the locus where self-discipline, as it has been described by Foucault, has been 
applied with more vehemence given that journalists work for the entrepreneur who 
controls them. 
The decline of journalists’ power should, as many scholars have argued (particularly 
since the mid-1990s), push them to build a new relationship and alliance with audiences. 
At the heart of the argument towards a co-creative relationship between professional 
journalists and TPFLATA lies the recognition of a new or modified power relationship 
between news users and producers, as well as between amateurs and professional 
journalists. It can be heralded as a democratization of media access, as an opening up of 
the conversation society has with itself, as a way to get more voices heard in an otherwise 
rather hierarchical and exclusive public sphere. In this scenario, some of the traditional 
and generally uncontested social power of journalists now flows towards publics, and 
potentially makes for a flatter hierarchy in the gathering, editing, publication and 
dissemination of news and information of public interest. In fact the power of journalists 
was based on the complex labor they did, which required a high degree of specialization. 
The decline of communication costs provoked by the use of the internet by a mass of 
well-educated users has undermined this exclusive status for the profession. Forums, 
blogs, social networks and so on do not are only other means of news dissemination, but 
they represent also an alternative to the traditional publication of news.  
By all means, this is an important intervention on the audience side. But what Rosen and 
others tend to neglect or underestimate, is another equally if not more powerful 
redistribution of power taking place in the contemporary media ecosystem: a sapping of 
economic and cultural power away from professional journalists to what can be called 
“The People Formerly known as the Employers” (TPFKATE).12  
TPFKATE 
Employers in the news industry traditionally offered most of their workers permanent 
contracts, included healthcare and other benefits (near the end of the 20th century 
sometimes even including maternal leave), pension plans, and in most cases even 
provisions sponsoring reporters to retrain themselves, participate in workshops, and serve 
on boards that gave them a formal voice in future planning and strategies of the firm.13 
Today, most if not all of that has disappeared - especially when we consider the youngest 
journalists at work. 
Today, the international news industry is contractually governed by what the 
International Federation of Journalists in 2006 euphemistically described as “atypical 
work”, which means all kinds of freelance, casualized, informal, and otherwise 
contingent labor arrangements that effectively individualize each and every workers' 
rights or claims regarding any of the services offered by employers in the traditional 
sense as mentioned.14 This, in effect, has workers compete for (projectized, one-off, per-
story) jobs rather than employers compete for (the best, brightest, most talented) 
employees. 
Furthermore, news work in particularly English, Italian, Spanish, and German-speaking 
countries gets increasingly outsourced: to subcontracted temporary workers or even off 
shored to other countries, where the TPFKATE practice what has been called “Remote 
Control Journalism.”15 Journalists today have to fight with their employers to keep the 
little protections they still have, and do so in a cultural context of declining trust and 
credibility in the eyes of audiences (the few “audiences” that still exist given the Rosen 
formula), a battle for hearts and minds that they have to wage without support from those 
who they traditionally relied on: their employers. Journalists now pay the price to not 
have included in these struggles the young journalists paid 25 euros per article, the 
trainees, and so on. Without all these people they do not have the sufficient critical mass 
to win the battle against the publishers. 
Power shift 
If one tries to look more deeply at the radical changes that are occurring in the news 
world are, according to Agostini16, the result of a power shift among the social actors 
who in the past had different levels of power and who, in this stage, see the quantity and 
quality of this power radically changing. Behind the restructuring of power relationships 
between publishers, journalists and audiences there is a series of trials of strength on a 
variety of issues. Central to these issues are the uses of (new) technologies, labor laws, 
and even the definitions of what “news” is in the service of power redistribution. 
Emplyers can take advantage of IT technology in the newsroom in order to reduce 
journalists’ power and social prestige by introducing massive outsourcing and other 
forms of precarious labor, as reported by scholars in Europe, North America, and 
Australia in particular.17; the possibility for employers to diminish and discourage 
unionization among journalists18, as unions contribute to shaping a class of journalists not 
sufficiently obedient towards editorial policies established by directors and management; 
and the arrival to the end of the line of the classical conceptualization and format of 
news, which is traceable in the decrease of newspaper sales and television news 
viewership in the old industrialized countries. 
In these trials of strength between media groups, journalists and audiences, the weakest 
actors are the journalists, since they are the workers of the situation. Media groups have 
the capital and own the means of production, so they have command over the news 
organizational process;  audiences are fragmented and dispersed, so they do not have the 
power to require a commodity tailored as they need or like, but they have purchasing 
power (that they are strongly exercising), so the power to not buy a commodity if they do 
not like it or have other alternatives. In the end, journalists have only their labor force to 
sell, and in addition they are forced to sell it at an increasingly lower price. 
In this picture we must recall that an anomaly has developed. Audiences have exercised 
not only their purchasing power towards news (which has decreed the death of several 
newspapers), but have also summoned the right to directly create “their” news. Becoming 
owners of the production means in the IT socio-technical system (as predicted by 
McLuhan and others in the 1960s), they use these tools in order to access online news for 
free first, and secondly move on to make news about, and for, themselves. In other 
words: audiences take the advantage to change their status in the “marketplace of ideas” 
and have become also producers, instead of only consumers. The anomaly, articulated by 
Terranova in 200019 and Manovich in 200120,  is that audiences, by producing news for 
free, have began to supply unwaged labor. This had the effect that audiences began to 
work for free throughout the news system (starting with letters to the editor, and moving 
via talk radio and opinion polls on TV to forms of public or civic journalism in the 1980s 
to todays’ so-called “citizen” news). This unwaged labor is beneficial (because free) 
towards media groups, but at the same time it changes the inner logic of news and of the 
journalists’ job, taking from media groups’ hands the exclusive right to produce news and 
the prerogative to dictate the rules of the game. 
Yet this unwaged labor is apparently also beneficial for journalists, who find on the web a 
precious source of information, of stories, and expertise. In reality journalists today enter 
in competition with the unwaged labor of TPFKATA for a chance to tell stories (and earn 
a living). The socio-technical system of news in fact takes advantage of this competition, 
with the consequence that the unwaged labor serves to de-valorize the waged labor of 
news. As employers, if you can have news for free on the part of audiences, you try to 
pay increasingly less for journalists’ news (including the work of photographers, sound 
engineers, and other production-realted labor in the journalism industry). It is a 
competition that makes both worse instead of empowering them. This situation sees 
journalists loosing a lot of power and prestige and audiences winning very few assets and 
only a few media groups earning a lot of money. This is not a process particular to the 
current post-industrial new media age, as journalists started to lose their battle as early as 
the 1970s and 1980s. In fact while until the 1960s many intellectuals such as writers, 
academics and journalists were “engaged” in the Sartrian sense or organic intellectuals as 
Gramsci proposed21 so they were part of the lifebelt organized around the working class 
and the weakest social subjects, in the 1970s and 1980s they reacted to the reflux of 
struggles and mobilizations by serving the powers that be – often in the name of the 
market and reaching a more “general” audience.22 In doing so, they were increasingly co-
opted by the power and from watchdogs of democracy they were transformed into 
lapdogs (or at the very least, “ambivalent” watchdogs23). At the same time, today many 
media groups are not better off. They go through a financial and organizational crisis 
since they do not have clear business or industrial models of producing news in a 
profitable way in the context of an increasingly participatory digital culture.24  
This power shift from journalists to media groups and audiences has been favored also by 
the fact that much of the news as produced today is a commodity that people have either 
come to expect as “free” (through free daily newspapers  or online via services like 
Google News), or that people tend to reject as irrelevant to their individual interests. 
Beyond this, the traditional approach to the market by news firms – outsourcing of stories 
to news agencies (such as AP and Reuters), and more emphasis on topics and themes in 
the realm of entertainment and lifestyle (genres generally covered much better by other 
media) – has not worked. It is therefore also the emergence of news as a commodity 
without value that threatens the jobs and the overall creative process of journalists. 
Immaterial labor workers 
If we call publishers “The People Formerly known as the Employers” (TPFKATE), and 
citizens TPFKATA, how can we call journalists? Just employees? We prefer to not use 
this term since it is an old Fordist category which refers to a world which hardly exists in 
the precarious context of labor today. But they are also not exclusively journalists 
anymore, as today more and more news companies call their audiences journalists as well 
– for example by starting divisions or segments labeled as such (as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter). This unwaged form of journalism is conceptualized by Andrew Keen25 as 
an amateurs’ activity, which produces for free a commodity that media groups use 
without paying anything. We propose to use a more pertinent category to define today 
journalists: immaterial labor workers.26 This category might have the merit to situate 
journalists inside the large stratum of workers who have to deal with abstract labor.27 
Producing news is situated inside the variegated production of immaterial commodities, 
such as information, communication, education, entertainment, learning and so on. All 
these workers are subjected to a very strong policy of legal compression of their 
normative profile, economic impoverishment and loss of social status.28 
Considering journalists as immaterial labor workers puts what is happening in 
newsrooms in perspective. Journalists belong to those professionals, like academics, 
researchers, other media professionals and artists whose professional profiles, labor 
content and skills are re-shaped by new media, digital culture, and ICTs. While an 
increasing part of the working population is joining these professionals in doing 
immaterial labor (public servants, services workers and so on), it becomes a priority for 
post-modern economic systems to break their power and reorganize all the sectors on a 
transnational scale (as that is the scale on which the industry operates in terms of 
financing and ownership) as a huge, horizontal working class sector.  
Beyond the cult of amateurs 
We do not share the approach advanced by Andrew Keen, already mentioned, who sees 
audiences as news producers like amateurs and criticizes them for doing this. We see his 
argument primarily serving as a self-defense elaborated by one of the professionals who 
are already on the way of decline. Keen’s analysis, however, has several thoughts that are 
sharable. As news produced outside of a salaried and otherwise professionally sanctioned 
context, news production by bloggers, independent news websites owners and so on is an 
activity supplied during the spare time, after the work day, and on the basis of voluntary 
engagement. This type of activity can be configured as an affective activity - done when 
one can and wants, for the period one decides, in the way one decides. Of course, not 
being regulated by a waged work relationship which establishes duties and rights, this 
activity has boundaries, meanings and purposes which may be not standard. News 
provided in this framework might reach a very high quality, might be a bulwark of the 
truth and so on, but it has also many limits. Second, this unwaged newswork is a 
journalism that might work well locally, but, generally not being based on a financial 
investment, does not guarantee the structural production of news from abroad or from 
faraway (while we recognize the successes of individual entrepreneurs and traveling 
reporters served by donations). The problem is not to choose between amateur and 
professional journalism, because they are both necessary in the current world of 
information. They represent polarities of power, of different interests, but they are 
obliged to negotiate a new type of relationship between them, in which the power is less 
asymmetrically divided or aligned. 
This widespread behavior to provide unpaid labor has been exported in many industrial 
sectors from the domestic sphere, where reproductive labor (making children, 
reconstructing the energy of labor forces, cleaning the house, cook, taking care of family 
members and so on) has traditionally been supplied by unpaid subjects (mainly 
women)29. But how to interpret this behavior? One could argue it represents a kind of 
rebellion against the current capitalistic system, based on the salaried social relationship. 
This system has in recent decades increasingly been experienced directly by women 
entering the creative industries workforce and generally finding it hostile to inclusivity 
and diversity concerns, unfair regarding salarization (as female media professionals get 
paid significantly less than their male colleagues of equal rank and standing). From this 
point of view, unwaged work escapes from the formal and informal rules imposed at the 
socio-economic level, but in a way in which it pays all the prices of rebellion. In its final 
outcome –unpaid news labor - it summons the freedom to frame the news in an 
autonomous way at the cost of serving to the survival of media groups.  
Pareto’s principle and the web 
The debate on the online production of news by audiences and on the real or perceived 
participation of people in the (or a) public sphere can be analyzed in the light of Pareto’s 
principle30. According to Pareto’s principle, 80% of effects come from the top 20% of 
sources and conversely the remaining 20% of effects come from the lower 80% of 
sources. This means that not only online production follows this principle, also online 
consumption is readable inside the framework of Pareto’s principle. It was Clay Shirky 
who in 2003 noted that few blogs had many links going into them, while “the long tail” 
of millions of blogs had only few links going into them. This “long tail’”concept was 
further developed by Chris Anderson who in October 2004 published in Wired magazine 
an article describing the effects of the long tail on current and future business models. 31  
Although this proportion is variable and generally does not follow the 80-20 rule neatly, 
what remains valid is that the majority of the effects come from a minority of sources. If 
we look at what happens on the web, it emerges that probably both production and 
consumption follows Pareto’s principle. Research by web observers tends to show that 
this principle describes with sufficient approximation online production and participation. 
In fact, if we compare lurkers (those who simply surf, watch and go back)32 with those 
who do not limit themselves to watch but  actively contribute something such as posting a 
message in a forum or actively participating in a mailing list and so on, very probably we 
risk to find the same proportion. The proportion 80 20 has been corrected as regards the 
contemporary online content by Jakob Nielsen who termed this inequal participation as 
the “90-9-1” rule:  “in most online communities, 90% of users are lurkers who never 
contribute, 9% of users contribute a little, and 1% of users account for almost all the 
action.”33  Overall, then, one can conclude that fairly straightforward power laws 
determine online (as well as offline) levels of participation. 
Coming back to news production and consumption, it emerges that people online do not 
consume, as Mattew Hindman shows34, what they have produced as bloggers or 
forumers, but what corporate media groups (online newspapers, only mainstream news 
websites, and so on) produce and offer as news. The dichotomy between news production 
and consumption must be taken always into account when we talk about prosumers, the 
famous word launched almost 30 years ago by Alvin Toffler35, since this term risks to be 
misleading.  
The long tail offers to various suppliers opportunities to introduce news in the niche 
category and this encourages the diversification and pluriformity of news. Amongst the 
hundreds of millions of bloggers worldwide, there are several who have a link authority 
superior to that of the majority of online newspapers. These niche news platforms open 
opportunities for suppliers while concomitantly satisfying the demands of many 
individuals.  
Is there a long tail for news? 
To what extent is Pareto’s principle and its subsequent correction applicable to online 
news or is it better instead to recur to the long tail approach? In a 2006 working paper 
titled "Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello Long Tail", Erik Brynjolfsson, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu 
and Duncan Simester found that the internet, by lowering search, distribution and 
inventory costs, could increase the share of hard-to-find products and create a longer tail 
in the distribution of sales.36 They found that a significant amount of Amazon.com's sales 
come from obscure books, and that products with a low sales volume can collectively 
make up a market share that competes and sometimes exceeds that of bestsellers. In other 
words, the total volume of low popularity items exceeds the volume of high popularity 
items. Anderson has explained the term Long Tail as a potential market in which people 
that purchase a large number of "non-hit" items are the demographic group called the 
Long Tail, and has referred it to the tail of a demand curve.  
If we look at the Long Tail from the producers' side, it seems that it has made possible a 
spreading and development of creativity across all fields of human endeavour. But when 
there is not a market relationship and regulation between users and consumers as in the 
case of the unpaid labour of producing news, does the Long Tail, as it is described by 
Chris Anderson, work? And if yes, in which terms? We argue that the Long Tail works 
also in the case of online news produced in the tail where the costs of production and 
distribution are low, since the immaterial labour done by millions of bloggers is 
apparently for free. In reality, there is another form of payment that might be as much 
motivating as the money: reputation and visibility. If we measure a product in terms of 
the quantity of attention that it attracts, reputation and visibility can be then converted in 
many other things: contracts, an occupation, public and so on.  Given the diminishing 
cost of communication and information sharing and the reduction in search costs and 
given the indirect gains that can derive to long-tailed news producers and users, this 
activity will gain importance for businesses. On their part journalists, in following a long-
tailed news production strategy, can use the model to tap into a large section of the 
people formerly known as the audience that is in the low-intensity area of the 
distribution. It is their collaboration and aggregated work that results in an informative 
effort. News communities formed by large groups of prosumers can perform rapidly the 
process of verification of, sharing, and diffusing information. Let us apply to the news 
sector the analysis that Von Hippel applies in his book Democratizing Innovation where 
he defines the user-led innovation model. As information becomes more user-centered it 
needs to flow freely, in a more democratic way, potentially creating a “rich intellectual 
commons” and “attacking a major structure of the social division of labor”, thus 
empowering journalists operating outside the boundaries of the traditional waged 
working environment. 
News and social networks 
The thing that is more in crisis in the journalistic world is the most important commodity 
they produce: the identity and the essence of news. Nietzsche’s reflections on the need to 
be untimely are like ghosts in the history of news.37 News until the last two decades has 
been the result of a system which unilaterally decided what could become a news (gate-
keeping, most memorably reflected in the New York Times tagline: “All The News 
That’s Fit To Print”, implying that the journalists of the newspaper can and should be the 
sole arbiters of what indeed is fitting). Given that media have always been part of the 
power system, in the tradition of news there has always been a concern about legitimating 
power (and being part of the powerful), to use a Weberian expression, and a certain level 
smugness towards it. This for example is reflected in the way the informal hierarchy of 
the profession is organized around its most celebrated practitioners: those closest to 
(political) power, such as White House correspondents in the US and parliamentary 
specialist reporters elsewhere.  
It has always been as if the news were produced, framed and addressed to power, but 
with the secondary, although important aim, to leave people outside to consume it. The 
relevant point was that people could not understand current affairs but instead should 
have a certain version and interpretation of what happened, which essentially served to 
occult reality. News thus acted to construct a specific kind of reality – but never a reality 
subject to consensus, as Luhmann would argue.  
The only thing to which people could aspire was to buy news without being able to 
intervene in any other way than as consumers. The big power consisted in the fact that 
the mass was huge enough to make media a lot of money, but fragmented enough to not 
becoming able to build a power as consumers, separated inside it, one from the other. The 
big novelty of the last two decades has been not only user-generated content, the coming 
to light of prosumers, but also the advent of networked audiences, so of audiences which 
are not necessarily separated anymore, but can be (and often are) connected.  
The advent of networked publics38 represents an important development in the 
framework of media systems, since it is a public(s) which can overcome fragmentation 
and isolation inside it, and interconnect in a variety of ways. This element increases the 
power of audiences because it increases their possibility to speak with each other. Social 
networks are the ideal tool to develop an informed, “informational” (using Schudson’s 
phrase), as well as informing audience, and to develop a bottom-up public opinion 
formation process. Of course these are processes which are in their infancy.  
Beyond these crucial considerations lies another aspect that has not yet been stressed up 
to now and which instead is very important: a shift in the register of news. Up to now we 
are used to get mainly written information in print and online newspapers or multimodal 
information in TV and audio information in radio. But this division of the different 
linguistic registers is currently subjected to a restructuring towards new forms of 
convergent, crossmedia, or multimedia (i.e. transmedia and cross-media) storytelling. We 
are passing from a culture of written online to a culture of multimodal web coupled with 
read/write (instead of read-only) media literacies. This shift too inevitably will influence 
the culture of news, both online and offline. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Hierarchies, both within the profession of journalism as well as between journalism and 
its audiences are flattening. Employers in the news industry turn their organizations into 
“shell” or “zombie” institutions: alive with production, but dead with (waged) producers. 
The work that journalists do has become immaterial, and must be seen in conjunction 
with the “free labor” of news and information-producing “networked publics,” suggesting 
the emergence of a “long tail” for news. Amplified by trends online, a journalism without 
journalists is, in a traditional sense, a source of concern indeed. However, when seen 
through the critical lens of journalisms’ cosy relationship with society’s elite institutions 
(including itself) and the potential of re-engagement with a self-organizing and self-
producing citizenry, perhaps a journalism without journalists is exactly what we need.  
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